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A key component of social understanding is the ability to read intentions from movements.
But how do we discern intentions in others’ actions? What kind of intention information
is actually available in the features of others’ movements? Based on the assumption that
intentions are hidden away in the other person’s mind, standard theories of social cognition
have mainly focused on the contribution of higher level processes. Here, we delineate an
alternative approach to the problem of intention-from-movement understanding.We argue
that intentions become “visible” in the surface flow of agents’ motions. Consequently, the
ability to understand others’ intentions cannot be divorced from the capability to detect
essential kinematics. This hypothesis has far reaching implications for how we know other
minds and predict others’ behavior.
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Room H3 in King’s College, Cambridge, was crowded that night.
It was 25 October 1946, and Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein
were battling over the very trajectory of their discipline, when
Wittgenstein picked up a fire-poker. Did Wittgenstein brandish
the poker to threaten Popper, or did he merely pick it up absent-
mindedly to give emphasis to his own remarks? (Edmonds and
Eidinow, 2001).
Whenweobserve others acting,whatmatters are their goals and
intentions. In the above“poker incident,”what matters – especially
fromPopper’s point of view – isWittgenstein’s intention in picking
up the poker. But how do we discern intentions in others’ actions?
What kind of information about intentions is actually available in
the features of others’ movements? (Baldwin and Baird, 2001).
The ability to interpret and predict the behavior of other
people hinges crucially on judgments about the intentionality
of their actions – whether they act purposefully (with intent)
or not – as well as on judgments about the specific intentions
guiding their actions. Until recently, however, direct investi-
gation of these skills has been surprisingly rare. One obstacle
to such investigation has been the framing of the problem
as a problem of access to mental states which are hidden
away in the other person’s mind and therefore inaccessible
to perception. As Gallagher (2008) puts it, the supposition
has been precisely that intentions are “not things that can be
seen.”
Recent findings challenge this view by positing that inten-
tions are specified at a tangible and quantifiable level in
the movement kinematics (Becchio et al., 2010). “How” an
action is performed is not solely determined by biomechan-
ical constraints, but it depends on the agent’s intention,
i.e., “why” the action is performed. This raises the intrigu-
ing possibility that intentions – regarded as covert mental
state dispositions by standard theories of social understand-
ing – may become “visible” in a person’s overt motor behavior
(Runeson and Frykholm, 1983).
In this Perspective article, we discuss this hypothesis in light
of recent kinematics and psychophysical evidence. An apt char-
acterization of the ability to understand others’ intentions, we
argue,maynot abstract froma systematic assessment of how inten-
tions translate into movements. In line with this, the first section
shows how kinematics techniques can be applied to investigate
the influence of intention on grasping movements. Intention is
here defined at the level of “why” an actor is performing a specific
action with an object, i.e., the distal goal of the action (Grafton
and de C Hamilton, 2007). Following the demonstration that
intention influences action kinematics, the second section reviews
evidence that observers are capable to pick-up intention informa-
tion from movement patterns. The third and final sections discuss
the implications of these findings for future research on action
understanding.
WHAT DOES KINEMATICS TELL US ABOUT INTENTIONS IN
ACTION EXECUTION?
Research on hand kinematics has proven insightful in reveal-
ing how specific kinematic landmarks modulate with respect to
object properties, including object size, shape, texture, fragility,
and weight. As recently reviewed, all these factors influence the
kinematics of grasping (Castiello, 2005). The way an object is
grasped, however, does not only depend exclusively on the proper-
ties of the object, but it is also influenced by the agent’s intention.
This was first demonstrated by Marteniuk et al. (1987) by ask-
ing participants to grasp a disk and either fit it carefully or
throw it. The deceleration time was longer for fitting than for
throwing (see Table 1). Since this seminal work, a plethora of
studies have investigated how intentions influence the execution
of reach-to-grasp movements (e.g., Ansuini et al., 2006, 2008;
Armbrüster and Spijkers, 2006). The logic of these studies has
been to “manipulate” the intention while keeping the object to
be grasped (i.e., goal) as well as the situational requirements (i.e.,
context) constant (see Figure 1). If within the same context, the
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Table 1 | A brief overview of the main kinematic variables traditionally used to describe reach-to-grasp movements.
Kinematics variables Frequently used definition Units
Proximal component Wrist velocity The module of rate of change of marker displacement with respect to time mm/s
Reach onset Time at which the wrist velocity crosses a threshold (e.g., 5 mm/s) and remains above
it for a given period (e.g., longer than 500 ms)
ms
Reach offset Time at which the wrist velocity crosses a threshold (e.g., 5 mm/s) and remains below
it for a given period (e.g., longer than 500 ms)
ms
Movement duration Time interval between reach onset and offset ms
Time to peak velocity The moment in time in which the wrist velocity reaches its maximum during movement ms
Wrist acceleration The module of rate of change of velocity with respect to time mm/s2
Deceleration peak The moment in time in which wrist acceleration reaches the minimum; it occurs
between time to peak velocity and reach offset
ms
Acceleration peak The moment in time in which wrist acceleration reaches the maximum; it occurs
between reach onset and time to peak velocity
ms
Distal component Grip aperture The Euclidean distance between the marker placed on thumb tip and that placed on
the tip of the index finger
mm
Time to max grip aperture The moment in time when the maximum distance between the thumb and the index
finger was reached during movement
ms
Grip aperture velocity The rate of change of the grip aperture with respect to time mm/s
The proximal component refers to the “reaching” and is described by variables obtained from the radial aspect of the wrist. The distal component refers to the
“grasping” and is described by variables obtained from thumb and index fingers. With three or more markers (a configuration classically used for reach-to-grasp
movements), the distances and angles at joints can be measured as well as the accelerations and velocities of hand and limb segments. Please note that to compare
movements with different absolute durations, time variables can be normalized with respect to the movement duration (e.g., % of normalized movement duration).
same object is handled differently depending on the agent’s inten-
tion, this would indicate that the intention influences the grasping
kinematics.
This hypothesis has been tested in two-digit grasp studies as
well as in multi-digit grasp studies that investigated how the whole
hand is shaped during the unfolding of the reach-to-grasp move-
ment. Ansuini et al. (2008), for example, asked participants to
reach toward and grasp a bottle to accomplish one of four possi-
ble actions: pouring, displacing, throwing, or passing. Analysis of
digit kinematics revealed that when the bottle was grasped with
the intent to pour, both the middle and the ring fingers were more
extended than in all the other considered intentions. Similarly,
choice of hand placement on the object has been shown to adapt
to the upcoming intention. For example, participants place their
thumb and index finger in a higher position when they grasp a
bottle with the intention to pour than when they grasp it with the
intention to lift (Crajé et al., 2011).
Further studies have extended these effects to the domain of
social intention. For instance, it has been shown that partici-
pants’ maximal finger aperture is smaller and grip aperture velocity
increases when an object is reached and grasped with the intent
to move it compared to when it is grasped with the intent to pass
it to another person (Becchio et al., 2008a; see also Sartori et al.,
2009; Quesque et al., 2013). At a higher level of abstraction, Bec-
chio et al. (2008b; see also Georgiou et al., 2007) showed that the
kinematics of graspingmovements differed depending onwhether
the object was grasped with the intent to cooperate with a partner,
compete against anopponent, or performan individualmovement
at slow or fast speed. Despite similar task requirements, movement
duration was shorter and wrist velocity was higher for “competi-
tive” than for “individual fast” movements. Conversely, movement
duration was longer and wrist velocity was lower for “cooperative”
than for “individual slow” movements.
WHAT DOES KINEMATICS TELL US ABOUT INTENTIONS IN
ACTION OBSERVATION?
The above findings suggest that intentions influence action plan-
ning so that, although the to-be-grasped object is the same,
different kinematic features are selected depending on the over-
arching intention. That intention information is available in
the kinematic pattern of human action, however, is not to say
that it can be perceptually appreciated. Are observers sensi-
tive to differences in movement kinematics? Can they use them
to discriminate between movements performed with different
intentions?
One approach for probing the contribution of visual kinemat-
ics is progressive temporal occlusion, where multiple occlusion
points are used so as to provide selective vision to different
time periods or events within an observed action sequence
(Farrow et al., 2005). This paradigm has been used with a
number of different sports to demonstrate superior attune-
ment to advance kinematic information by experts over non-
experts (e.g., Abernethy and Zawi, 2007; Abernethy et al., 2008).
For example, it has been shown that in racquet sports such
as badminton to predict the depth of an opponent’s stroke,
expert players use advance pre-impact kinematic information to
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FIGURE 1 |Techniques used to quantify the influence of intention on
movement kinematics. (A) Example of experimental set-up employed in
action execution studies. The participant sits at a table with his hand resting
in a starting position, which is kept constant across participants. The task is
to reach and grasp the object (i.e., a bottle) either to lift it or to place it
inside a box. An optoelectronic system (Vicon Motion Systems Ltd., UK)
equipped with nine infra-red cameras is used to quantify reach-to-grasp
movements. This system relies on passive markers (retro-reflective material
on a plastic sphere) placed on points of interest over participant’s hand. An
infra-red light is transmitted toward the work space area and the rays are
reflected back off the markers to a series of “cameras” that record their
positions. These positions are then referred to a coordinate system, the
origin of which is either in 2-D or 3-D coordinates, i.e., two or three
mutually orthogonally axes, each passing through the origin. (B) A
computer-generated stick figure representing the position of the markers
placed over arm and hand joints during a reach-to-grasp movement toward
the bottle. After collecting raw data, it is possible to identify and track the
marker’s trajectories almost in real time by means of tracking procedures.
which less skilled players are not attuned (Abernethy and Zawi,
2007).
Adapting the same logic to intention anticipation, Sartori
et al. (2011) tested whether observers use pre-contact kinematic
information to anticipate the intention in grasping an object.
To this end, they first analyzed the kinematics of reach-to-grasp
movements performed with different intents: cooperate, compete
against an opponent, or perform an individual action at slow or
fast speed. Next, they selected videos representative of each type of
intention and prepared experimental video-clips. Each clip started
before reach onset and ended at the time the fingers contacted
the object so that neither the second part of the movement, nor
the interacting partner, when present, were visible. Participants
watched these videos and judged the intention in a yes/no detec-
tion task. The results revealed that observers were able to judge
the agent’s intent by simply observing the initial reach-to-grasp
phase of the action (Sartori et al., 2011; but see also Naish et al.,
2013).
But what specific cues did participants use to make their antici-
pation judgments? To examine the spatial location of anticipatory
information, in a second psychophysical study, Sartori et al. (2011)
combined temporal and spatial occlusion procedures to mask visi-
bility to selected spatial areas of the agent’smovement. Masking the
visibility of the upper part of the agent’s body (i.e., from shoulders
to head) caused no significant decrements in prediction accuracy,
suggesting that observers were able to pickup useful information
from the arm kinematics (Sartori et al., 2011).
The spatial occlusion method helps to determine how much
information is lost when a specific spatial region of the display is
masked. However, because other areas of the display can poten-
tially provide compensatory or alternative information, it does not
indicate how much information is carried in isolation by specific
kinematic features (Abernethy et al., 2008). To obtain an analytic
determination of the key kinematic features that provide useful
advance information about the agent’s intention, in a subsequent
study Manera et al. (2011) rendered reach-to-grasp movements
as point-light displays. Though the displays were reduced to only
three disconnected points of light corresponding to the position
of the markers on the wrist, the index finger, and the thumb of
the agent’s hand, participants were nonetheless able to discrimi-
nate between social and individual intentions from the unfolding
movement kinematics.
UNDERSTANDING OTHERS’ INTENTIONS: IMPLICATIONS
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Considered together, the studies reviewed above indicate that
observers are capable of picking up and using kinematic infor-
mation to make judgments not only about movement patterns
but also about intentions. In this section, we consider some of
the theoretical and the methodological issues raised by these find-
ings and speculate on the ways in which they may be addressed by
future research.
HOW DOES KINEMATICS COMBINE WITH OTHER SOURCES OF
INFORMATION?
How does movement kinematics combine with other sources of
information in revealing others’ intentions? There are situations
in which the intention of an observed actor can be unambigu-
ously estimated from one source of information, e.g., the type
of grasp, the presence of a target object. Most often, however,
combining different sources of information may lead to more
accurate predictions. This is indeed what Stapel et al. (2012)
demonstrated by asking participants to anticipate howanobserved
action would unfold. Participants observed an actor walking.
After a few steps, they had to indicate how the action would
continue, i.e., whether the actor would take another step walk-
ing or start crawling. A first experiment showed that observers
were more accurate when they could base their predictions on
the combination of movement kinematics, situational constraints
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(e.g., the presence of a table), and target object position (a
ball). In a second experiment, the target object was artificially
moved to another location so that movement kinematics was
incongruent with the target object position. Results revealed
that, in this ambiguous situation, participants relied on move-
ment kinematics rather than on object location in making their
predictions. This suggests that in the presence of conflicting
information from different sources, movement kinematics may
be prioritized to disambiguate the agent’s intention. A challenge
for future research will be to understand the temporal course of
information integration from different sources. A recent transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study by Cavallo et al. (2013)
demonstrated that, at movement onset, motor-evoked potential
responses reflected the most probable motor program estimated
from the situational context (e.g., whole hand grasp). During
movement observation, however, the initial motor program was
substituted by a new plan matching the specific features of the
observed movement (e.g., precision grip). Thus, an intrigu-
ing possibility is that the contribution of movement kinematics
is related to the specific stage of the observed action process-
ing: before the to-be-observed action starts, observers rely on
contextual factors to predict the course of the action; as the
movement unfolds, however, action prediction might prioritize
kinematic information. If confirmed, this would have implica-
tions for the interpretation of the so-called chain model of action
organization (Bonini et al., 2013): modulation of mirror neu-
ron discharge by end-goal might reflect not only (and not so
much) the presence of contextual cues allowing the monkey to
predict the experimenter’s intention (Fogassi et al., 2005), but
also sensitivity to intention-related differences in the movement
kinematics.
“SECOND-PERSON” VS. “THIRD-PERSON” INTENTION
UNDERSTANDING
The studies reviewed above used spatial and temporal occlu-
sion procedures to quantify pick-up of advance information.
The advantage of using psychophysical methods is the high
degree of control and statistical power they ensure. However,
it is not clear how far this type of paradigm accounts for real-
time interactions in which two or more individuals are set in
a common social context. Social cognition has been proposed
to be substantially different when we actively interact with oth-
ers (“second-person” social cognition) rather than merely observe
them (“third-person” social cognition; Schilbach et al., 2013). For
third-person social cognition, observing bodymovement ismerely
a way of gathering data about the other person. For second-
person social cognition, the knowledge of the other resides –
at least in part – in the interaction dynamics “between” the
agents (De Jaegher et al., 2010); it is thus plausible that inter-
action dynamics affect pick-up and use of advance kinematic
information.
An initial investigation on this topic was made by Streu-
ber et al. (2011) by adapting the spatial occlusion procedure
to a social interaction task. Participants played a table tennis
game in a dark room with only the table, the net, and the
ball visible. The game could be played in a cooperative fash-
ion, i.e., to play the ball back and forth as often as possible,
or in a competitive fashion, i.e., to win the trial. The vis-
ibility of the players’ racquets and the body movements was
manipulated with the following logic. If a specific source of
information is important for playing table tennis, then render-
ing this source of information visible should positively affect
the players’ performance. Results revealed that when the game
was played cooperatively, seeing the other player’s racket had the
largest effects on performance. In contrast, when the game was
played competitively, seeing the other player’s body resulted in the
largest increase in performance. This suggests that online coop-
erative and competitive dynamics selectively modulates the use
of visual information about others’ actions. A question to be
addressed by future research is whether a similar modulation is
observed in offline tasks, in which participants are required to
merely observe cooperative and competitive actions. More gen-
erally, it would be interesting to directly compare second-person
and third-person social understanding with respect to the pick-up
and the use of advance information: is attunement to kinematic
features modulated by self-involvement? Do second-person and
third-person intention understanding rely on the same kinematic
characteristics?
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE MECHANISMS WHICH ALLOW US TO
READ INTENTIONS IN OTHERS’ ACTIONS?
Ever since their discovery, mirror neurons have been proposed to
underlie our ability to understand actions “transforming visual
information into knowledge” about others’ goals and inten-
tions (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). But how exactly is this
transformation achieved?
Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004) suggested a rather simple
mechanism: “Each time an individual sees an action done by
another individual, neurons that represent that action are activated
in the observer’s premotor cortex.” This motor representation of
the observed action “corresponds to that which is spontaneously
generated during active action and whose outcome is known to
the acting individual.” In this way, mirror neurons would trans-
form visual information into knowledge about another person’s
intention.
This model has been criticized on the assumption that “the
same visual kinematics can be caused by different goals and inten-
tions” (Kilner et al., 2007). Simulating the observed kinematics – it
has been claimed – might allow an observer to represent what the
agent is doing. However, given the non-specificity of the observed
kinematics, it will not allow them to represent the agent’s intention
(Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005).
The findings reviewed above provide strong evidence to the
contrary. First, in contrast to the “non-specificity assumption,”
they demonstrate that intention information is specified in the
visual kinematics. Second, they indicate that observers are sen-
sitive to this information and can use it to discriminate between
different intentions. Evidence that the mirror system supports this
ability comes from recent fMRI studies (Vingerhoets et al., 2010;
Becchio et al., 2012). For example, Becchio et al. (2012) report
that mirror areas are sensitive to kinematic cues to social inten-
tion. Participants observed isolated reach-to-grasp movements
performed with the intent to cooperate, compete, or perform an
individual movement, followed by a static test picture. They were
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required to judge whether the test picture depicted a continuation
of the observed movement or not. Despite the lack of contex-
tual information, observing grasping movements performed with
a social intent relative to grasping movements performed with
an individual intent activated mirror areas, including the infe-
rior frontal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule. Interestingly,
comparison of social vs. individual movements also revealed dif-
ferential activations at the temporo-parietal junction and within
the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, two regions traditionally asso-
ciated with explicitly thinking about the state of minds of other
individuals (i.e., “mentalizing”). These findings shed some light
on the neural mechanisms underlying intention-from-movement
understanding. They leave, however, a number of crucial issues
unanswered.
A first issue pertains to how observed actions are mapped
onto one’s own motor system. The mirror system is generally
assumed to associate observed actionswith“corresponding”motor
programs of the observer. What though is exactly meant by “cor-
responding?” When we observe other individuals act, the very
fact that our body differs from theirs’ introduces a disparity
between the observed and the executed kinematics (for data on
this issue see for instance Gazzola et al., 2007). It is thus difficult to
envision how, at a computational level, the executed kinemat-
ics might be “coupled” with the observed kinematics (but see
Press et al., 2011).
A second question concerns the exact contribution provided
by the mirror and the mentalizing system (Van Overwalle and
Baetens, 2009). While some theorists have argued that these two
systems are mutually independent (e.g., Jacob and Jeannerod,
2005; Saxe, 2005), a substantial number of authors support the
notion that the mirror system might inform the mentalizing sys-
tem(e.g., Keysers andGazzola,2007;Uddin et al.,2007). According
to this view, people would use their own motor system to encode
the intentionality of an action based on its visual properties and
form a pre-reflective representation of the other person’sintention.
This representation would then serve as inputs to attributional
processing within the mentalizing system (Keysers and Gazzola,
2007; see also Spunt and Lieberman, 2012). In line with this,
de Lange et al. (2008) report that mirror areas, including the infe-
rior frontal gyrus, process the intentionality of an observed action
on the basis of the visual properties of the action, irrespective of
whether the subject paid attention to the intention or not. In
contrast, brain areas that are part of the mentalizing network
become active when subjects reflect about the intentionality of
an observed action, but are largely insensitive to the visual prop-
erties of the observed action. Alternatively, mirror neurons might
discharge during action observation not because they are driven
by the visual input but because they are part of a generative model
that is predicting the sensory input (Kilner, 2011). Within this
framework, the generative model starts with a prior prediction of
the intention of the observed action. This predictionwould be esti-
mated in areas outside the mirror system (including mentalizing
areas) and then conveyed to mirror areas, influencing the selec-
tion of a specific action intention. Techniques for characterizing
effective connectivity between brain areas can provide answers in
this debate because they can demonstrate the influence one system
exerts over the other.
CONCLUSION
The view that “motor” is separated from “mental” has long been
dismissed, yet traces of it remain in the way the problem of
intention understanding is currently addressed. Based on the
assumption that intentions are hidden away and therefore not
accessible to perception, standard theories of social cognition have
mainly focused on the contribution of higher level, inferential pro-
cesses to intention understanding. We argue that reframing the
relationship between intention and movement provides radically
new insights into the psychology and neurobiology of how we
know other minds and predict others’ behavior.
Did Wittgenstein pickup the poker to threaten Popper or to
give emphasis to his thoughts? As Popper’s account of the episode
proves, theway inwhichWittgenstein brandished the poker clearly
betrayed his intention.
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